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Abstract:
There is a fundamental dichotomy in immigration law. On one hand, courts have
consistently maintained that Congress has “plenary power” over immigration and reject
most constitutional challenges on that basis. On the other hand, courts frequently use
canons of statutory construction in an aggressive fashion to help interpret immigration
statutes in favor of aliens. Immigration scholars have almost exclusively focused on the
plenary power doctrine. They have either ignored the important role that canons have
played in immigration law or have viewed canons as serving only a temporary and
marginally legitimate role as substitutes for the lack of constitutional rights afforded
aliens. In this Article, I defend canons and argue that they should be viewed as having a
permanent and legitimate role in interpreting immigration provisions, even in cases where
no constitutional issues are raised. I explain that part of the function of some canons is to
require courts to sometimes adopt second-best interpretations of statutes. Contrary to the
claims of some scholars, these interpretations do not add unpredictability to the law.
While I defend the canons that courts have chosen to apply in immigration cases on
normative grounds, the Court’s recent application of the canon of constitutional
avoidance presents new concerns. The Court has recently transformed the canon, which
requires courts to avoid serious constitutional issues through statutory interpretations,
into a device that often gives aliens as a whole greater rights, at least temporarily, than
would a decision that rested on constitutional grounds. The expansion of the canon of
constitutional avoidance means that courts should be particularly careful when applying it
in order to avoid unnecessarily disrupting Congress’s legislative designs.
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INTRODUCTION
Interest in United States immigration law is arguably at an all time high, with the
public discussing the fate of the undocumented in our society and immigration scholars
opining on academically popular topics like the constitutional rights of aliens or the
appropriateness of the government using immigration provisions to help fight terrorism.1
Not many, however, are discussing the common judicial practice of using canons of
statutory construction to interpret important immigration statutes in favor of aliens.2 The
Supreme Court is an enthusiastic supporter of these canons, as are lower courts. Indeed,

1

"Alien" is a legal term under United States immigration laws, and it refers to any individual with alien
status in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (definitions). The term is considered by many to be
pejorative. Case law and scholarly articles, which must be quoted in this Article, refer extensively to
"alien" and "alienage," however. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the term will be used in this
Article.
2
It is obviously not surprising that the general public does not discuss canons, but academics have no
excuse.
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at times the Court seems to go out of its way to assert the relevance of canons in
interpreting statutes.3 Taking the Court’s cue, this Article makes a long overdue defense
of the role of canons of statutory construction in immigration law.
A large part of immigration scholarship has been focused on the goal of ensuring
that aliens are treated fairly by the government.4 One major barrier to this effort has been
Congress’s “plenary power” over immigration and the concomitant lack of constitutional
protections enjoyed by aliens. Typically, although Congress’s legislative power over
many areas (e.g., patents, interstate commerce) is described by courts as “plenary,” it is
still subject to normal constitutional limitations.5 In contrast, courts have traditionally
considered the power of the federal government over immigration to be nearly unlimited
and the constitutional rights of immigrants to be extremely limited—in many cases,
virtually nonexistent.6
In creating the plenary power doctrine in the late nineteenth century, the Court
relied heavily on policy, reasoning that the United States' existence as a sovereign state
should give it unfettered power to control immigration.7 Statutory interpretation in
3

See, e.g., Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348, 350 n.2 (2001) (stating “it remains instructive that the
Government acknowledges that background principles of statutory construction and constitutional concerns
must be considered in determining the scope of IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions”).
4
As used in this Article, the term “immigration law” refers to the law governing the admission and
expulsion of aliens, rather than on the more general law of aliens’ rights and obligations, such as their tax
status and eligibility for government benefits and employment. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L. J. 545, 547 (1990).
5
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
6
See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
7
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (asserting that the power to deport is “an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its
independence and its welfare”). See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the
Constitution, 83 Am. J. INT’L L. 862, 863 (1989) (stating that “the Court did not start with the text or
structure of the Constitution and ask how a power to regulate immigration might be inferred. Rather, it
approached the question of congressional power from the perspective of the conduct of foreign affairs.”).
This is not to suggest that the Court’s creation of the plenary power doctrine rested on sound principles.
See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND
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immigration law, however, often employs a very different set of policy objectives. In
contrast to the extreme deference they typically give Congress when considering, and
usually rejecting, constitutional challenges to statutes, courts frequently interpret
immigration statutes against the government, and often do so for policy reasons. When
interpreting statutes, courts regularly apply “substantive” canons of statutory
construction, which are policy based directives about how a lack of statutory clarity
should be resolved.8 These canons are underpinned by different, and quite varied,
policies supporting their application, but they almost always direct courts to interpret
statutes in favor of aliens and therefore help to ensure that aliens are treated fairly by the
government.9 Indeed, in many cases there is more than one applicable canon directing
the court to construe the statute in favor of the alien.10
Possibly the most controversial of these canons is the canon of constitutional
avoidance (“avoidance canon”), which requires a court to adopt a plausible—but not
necessarily the most persuasive—interpretation of a statute in order to avoid serious

AMERICA 195 (1987) (arguing that the Court erroneously developed the plenary power doctrine by relying
on cases that concerned only the federalism question of whether Congress, as opposed to states, could
exclude aliens at all).
8
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 634 (2d ed. 1995). Substantive canons are also sometimes referred
to as “normative canons,” among other terms. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479, 507 (1998).
In contrast to substantive canons, “textual canons” “set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the
drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of
the ‘whole’ statute.” See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY at 634. The Court also applies textual canons in
immigration cases, and these canons can influence the Court’s interpretation of statutes. See, e.g., Jama v.
ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 343 (2005) (applying “the grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent’”) (citation omitted).
9
Interpreting an immigration statute in accordance with a substantive canon usually, but not always,
benefits the alien. One case where a canon did not benefit the alien was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), where the Court applied the presumption that acts of Congress do not have
extraterritorial application unless such intent is clearly manifested in support of its statutory holding that the
Immigration and Nationality Act did not apply to actions taken by the Coast Guard on high seas. See id. at
173-74.
10
See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 298-300 (2001) (mentioning the avoidance canon, the
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the rule requiring a clear statement of
congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction).
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constitutional issues.11 Courts have frequently used this canon in immigration cases,
often in what can be described as an aggressive fashion.12 Although the avoidance canon
has been defended by the Court on the theory that application of it is an exercise in
judicial restraint, it is targeted by critics as evidence of judicial activism.13 In a highly
influential article written in 1990, Professor Motomura argued that the Court has used the
avoidance canon in an improper manner in immigration cases by avoiding constitutional
issues that were not serious and engaging in questionable statutory interpretations.14 In a
recent immigration case, Clark v. Martinez,15 the Court added a new and powerful aspect
to the avoidance canon by holding that a statutory interpretation adopted by invoking the
avoidance canon must be uniformly applied in subsequent cases, even if the subsequent
cases do not raise any constitutional issues.16 The end result of this concept, the “lowest
common denominator” principle, can be greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least
temporarily, than if the statutory provision had been struck down on constitutional
grounds.17
Although it is controversial and worthy of (extensive) discussion, focusing solely
on the avoidance canon inaccurately suggests that the canons used in immigration cases
only concern constitutional interests. To the contrary, courts often apply canons in
immigration cases in order to promote non-constitutional interests. One notable example
is the immigration rule of lenity, which directs courts to interpret ambiguous statutory
provisions in favor of the alien regardless of whether the case involves constitutional
11

See infra Part I.B. (describing the avoidance canon).
See Motomura, supra note 4, at 565-75 (describing immigration cases where the canon has been applied).
13
See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (explaining how the Court views application of the canon
as a means of giving effect to congressional intent).
14
See generally Motomura, supra note 4.
15
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
16
See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
12
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issues.18 Another canon that is applied without regard to constitutional issues is the
presumption against retroactivity, which has been particularly relevant in immigration
law in recent years due to Congress’s penchant for enacting statutes with possible
retroactive effects. This canon directs courts to give statutes only prospective effect
unless the statute clearly provides that it should have retroactive effect.19 Other canons,
such as the canon requiring that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably possible,
not to conflict with international law, are also applied regardless of constitutional
issues.20
Over the last couple of decades, possibly due in part to the increasing importance
of statutes as a source of law, there has been a renewed interest generally among scholars
and courts in statutory interpretation theory and canons of statutory construction.21
Despite this increased interest, and the liberal use of canons by courts in immigration
cases, statutory interpretation issues have not captured the attention of immigration
scholars in the same way as has the plenary power doctrine.22 Perhaps the most notable
exception to this disinterest amongst immigration scholars was Professor Motomura’s
influential article in which he examined the relationship between the plenary power
17

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part I.A.1. (describing the immigration rule of lenity).
19
See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (describing the presumption against retroactivity).
20
See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
21
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, A More Modest Proposal than a Common Law for the Age of Statutes:
Greater Reliance in Statutory Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretive Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949
(2005) (discussing the “statutorification” of American law); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the
Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 256 (1992) (stating that
judges are now “debating statutory interpretation methodologies at a level of theory that far transcends the
details of the case at hand, and that implicates the very question of the [judiciary’s] role in a democracy”).
22
The number of articles discussing the plenary power doctrine is staggering. The following are some
well-known examples. See, e.g., Louis H. Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Peter H. Schuck, The
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
18
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doctrine and how courts have interpreted immigration statutes.23 Professor Motomura
argued that in the past courts applied the avoidance canon in an improper manner by
using two sets of inconsistent constitutional rules in immigration cases.24 One set of
rules, usually mainstream constitutional rules favorable to aliens, were considered when
courts interpreted statutes to avoid constitutional issues. When courts were subsequently
forced to decide constitutional issues directly, however, they used a different set of rules,
usually based on the plenary power doctrine, that were unfavorable to aliens. Professor
Motomura argued that the second set of rules revealed the first set to be “phantom
constitutional norms.”25 The end result in Professor Motomura’s view was that the
avoidance canon was used by courts to engage in questionable statutory interpretations
that indirectly undermined the plenary power doctrine.26
Professor Motomura’s solution to the problem he described was for courts to
abandon the plenary power doctrine and apply mainstream constitutional rules in all
immigration cases.27 He believed that the Court’s phantom norm decisions were part of a
transitional phase and argued that “as judges become more willing to address
constitutional issues directly, rather than through statutory decisions, they should find
that they do not need to grope for these awkward and unpredictable statutory
decisions.”28 Thus, in Professor Motomura’s view, once the transition was complete,
courts would no longer have the same need to apply the avoidance canon or the
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1386-96 (1953).
23
See Motomura, supra note 4.
24
See id. at 549 (stating that “[t]he constitutional norms that courts use when they directly decide
constitutional issues in immigration cases are not the same constitutional norms that inform interpretation
of immigration statutes”).
25
See id. at 564-75 (describing and illustrating the phantom norms theory).
26
See id. at 549.
27
See id. at 612.
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immigration rule of lenity, which he viewed as a canon that was similarly designed to
express constitutional values.29
This Article attempts to fill a void in immigration scholarship by reevaluating and
defending the legitimacy and role of canons in immigration law. In part, this Article
responds to long-standing notions that canons serve primarily as short-term solutions to
the problem of the plenary power doctrine and that they add unpredictability to the law.
This Article also addresses important new issues that significantly affect how canons
should be viewed, such as the weakening of the plenary power doctrine and the lowest
common denominator principle. While this Article defends the role of canons in
immigration law, doing so does not imply that the plenary power doctrine should not be
abandoned or that the constitutional rights of aliens are unimportant. The elimination of
the plenary power doctrine would be a welcome development in immigration law. But
the role of the plenary power doctrine has been thoroughly examined. The same cannot
be said about canons. Considering the importance of canons in immigration law, it is
time for this oversight to be corrected.
This Article has five parts. Part I describes why the role of canons in immigration
law is a permanent one that is not tied to the existence of the plenary power doctrine.
Part II explains that the problem of judicial overutilization of canons should not be
confused with the legitimate role of canons in requiring courts to sometimes adopt
second-best interpretations of statutes. This Part argues that these second-best
interpretations, even if sometimes rather aggressive, do not add unpredictability to the
28

Id. at 602.
See id. at 600-01. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Motomura disagreed in his article with the
avoidance canon in general. Indeed, he stated that “[t]here is nothing wrong with borrowing constitutional
29
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law. Part III explains that due to the decline of the plenary power doctrine, courts now
have more opportunities to legitimately apply the avoidance canon without relying on
“phantom” constitutional norms.
Part IV explains how the new lowest common denominator principle has
transformed the avoidance canon into a device that can give aliens as a whole greater
rights, at least temporarily, than a decision that rested on constitutional grounds. This
Part argues that while this new development should caution courts to carefully apply the
avoidance canon, its influence should not be exaggerated. In many immigration cases
there is a second canon, in addition to the avoidance canon, that would require a uniform
interpretation even without the assistance of the lowest common denominator principle.
Finally, Part V defends the canons that courts have chosen to apply in immigration cases.
An immigration rule of severity, for example, might more accurately enact congressional
intent than the immigration rule of lenity. Nevertheless, the Court’s choice to apply the
immigration rule of lenity, as well as other canons, rests on sound public policy, which
courts have historically had the discretion to promote.

I.

The Permanent Status of Canons of Statutory Construction in
Immigration Law
Canons of statutory construction are important in immigration law. Judicial

interpretations of immigration statutes often favor aliens, and canons have played an
important role in these interpretations.30 Despite the fact that canons typically instruct

norms to interpret statutes.” Id. at 564. He did, however, urge courts to decide constitutional issues
directly rather than apply the avoidance canon and decide cases on statutory grounds. See id. at 612-13.
30
Because substantive canons almost always direct courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens, Karl
Llewellyn’s famous critique of canons where he argued that for every canon pointing in one direction
("thrusts") there is another canon pointing in the opposite direction ("parries") is not relevant to
immigration law, at least as regards substantive canons. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
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courts to interpret immigration statutes in favor of aliens, in theory the canons should
have a somewhat limited role in the interpretation of statutes. Even the strongest canon is
only applicable when a statute is less than “clear,” however that term is defined.31
Because they recognize that it is Congress that has the legislative power, courts generally
purport to act as the “faithful agents” of Congress and interpret statutes in a way that is
consistent with congressional intent.32 Thus, if a court believes that the meaning of a
statute is clear, that Congress has adequately expressed its intent, the court will interpret
the statute accordingly.
In reality, canons often play a significant role in the interpretation of statutes.
While courts may consider themselves bound by congressional intent, identifying
congressional intent regarding the meaning of a specific provision is not always easy, or

395, 398-404 (1950). One frequent complication to canons resolving statutory uncertainty in favor of the
alien, however, is the Chevron doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which requires that courts
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes for which the agency has authority to
administer. In many immigration cases courts have to deal with both the Chevron doctrine, which favors
the government if applicable, and canons, which typically favor the alien. In an earlier article, I discussed
the conflict between the Chevron doctrine and the immigration rule of lenity. See Brian G. Slocum, The
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 515 (2003).
31
The trigger for any substantive canon is something less than statutory clarity, but canons are not all
triggered by the same level of uncertainty. Clear statement canons, for example, are triggered by less
statutory ambiguity than are tie-breaker canons. See Slocum, supra note 30, at 544-46. While this
distinction is valid theoretically, courts have not been precise about what constitutes ambiguity. See Caleb
Nelson, What is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 396 (2005) (wondering “[h]ow big a gap must exist
between the leading interpretation and the next most likely alternative for the Court to say that the statute
permits only one construction”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 520 (noting the uncertainty in determining how much ambiguity is necessary
before a statute is deemed to be ambiguous).
32
See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005). I refer to intent
in a broad, generic sense. All statutory interpretation philosophies seek in some sense, at least in part, to
enact congressional intent. Even textualists seek to enact congressional intent, although the textualists
disagree with intent based philosophies about how congressional intent should be defined and how
statutory interpretation should seek to enact it. See id. at 422-43l; Nelson, supra note 31, at 353
(“Textualists and intentionalists alike give every indication of caring both about the meaning intended by
the enacting legislature and about the need for readers to have fair notice of that meaning, as well as about
some additional policy-oriented goals.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central
Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427 (2005).
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even possible.33 The statutes enacted by Congress are often vague or ambiguous because
Congress is unable and unwilling to address every important question that might arise
under its statutes and sometimes legislates with deliberate ambiguity.34 Thus, the
application of canons of some type is inevitable.35
Most immigration scholars have failed to appreciate the important role of canons
described above in helping to resolve inherent statutory uncertainty in a way that is
beneficial to aliens. In addition, the academy’s fascination with the plenary power
doctrine has caused its view of canons to be distorted in two important and related ways.
One distortion is the assumption that canons are primarily intended by courts to
compensate for the lack of constitutional rights enjoyed by aliens and that these canons
must therefore serve only to protect constitutional interests.36 Professor Motomura, for
example, criticizes the immigration rule of lenity as an “awkward way to express a
phantom constitutional norm” and asserts that it is an example of “overbroad

33

See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,
108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 (1995) (discussing the idea that “statutory meaning is necessarily created both
by interpretation and by legislation ”); Jarry L. Marshaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991) (stating that “attempts to link the
interpretation of statutes to the commands of an identifiable legislature are doomed”).
34
See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional
Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2002) (“There is
simply too much law today, governing too many subjects, for legislators to address every important policy
question that might arise under their statutes.”); ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 8, at 730-31 (stating that
Congress deliberately passes vague and ambiguous statutes which delegates to courts the power to "fill in
all the gaps" by way of a "common law" approach).
35
See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 640 (1999)
("It is hard to find anyone who believes that canons of construction have no legitimate place in
interpretation.").
36
See, e.g., David A. Martin, Major Issues in Immigration Law, 1987 WL 123658, *9 (F.J.C.) (stating that
the Supreme Court fashioned “a more interventionist rule of construction” “[a]lmost as if to compensate for
this constitutional deference”). I agree that part of the Court’s motivation in creating and applying canons
may be a desire to counteract the effects of the plenary power doctrine. I do contest, however, the idea that
these canons are dependent on a lack of constitutional rights for aliens.
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generosity.”37 The other distortion is the theory advanced by Professor Motomura that if
the Court were to end the plenary power doctrine, there would no longer be the same
need to apply canons such as the avoidance canon and the immigration rule of lenity.38
This Part argues that canons have a permanent role in immigration law that is not
dependent on, or in many cases even related to, the existence of the plenary power
doctrine. Section A illustrates how courts frequently apply canons in immigration cases
even when no constitutional issues are raised. It also refutes Professor Motomura’s
argument that the immigration rule of lenity is a canon that is designed to vindicate
constitutional rights. Section B describes briefly how the avoidance canon has a
permanent role in the interpretation of immigration statutes that would likely increase,
rather than decrease, if the plenary power doctrine were ended.

A.

Canons That Promote Non-Constitutional Interests
1.

The Immigration Rule of Lenity

One of the most significant of the immigration canons that is applied regardless of
whether constitutional issues are raised is the immigration rule of lenity, described by the
Court as "the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in
deportation statutes in favor of the alien."39 Professor Motomura is correct in his
observation that the immigration rule of lenity is an “awkward way to express a phantom
37

See Motomura, supra note 4, at 600, 601 . See also id. at 573 (stating that in Fong Haw Tan [the case in
which the Court created the immigration rule of lenity], “the Court allowed phantom constitutional norms
to guide statutory interpretation by reading statutes in favor of aliens”).
38
See id. at 602 (stating that courts will “not need to grope for awkward and unpredictable
subconstitutional solutions”); id. at 603 (“With such changes in constitutional immigration law giving
judges new freedom to address constitutional claims directly, it seems less objectionable when a court
breaks the [immigration rule of lenity], which is the least precise subconstitutional solution, by refusing to
read deportation statutes in favor of aliens”).
39
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). The canon has not been completely ignored by
immigration scholars. See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 7, at 156 (calling the immigration rule of lenity
“[t]he most important rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration”).
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constitutional norm” and that it represents “overbroad generosity,” in the sense that it
applies even when the government’s interpretation of a statute does not raise any
constitutional concerns.40 The problem with this observation is that the immigration rule
of lenity should not be viewed in such a narrow fashion.
The immigration rule of lenity directs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in
favor of aliens, regardless of whether constitutional rights are at stake.41 Designed by the
Court to protect a vulnerable minority, the canon is thus more similar to a canon such as
the one directing courts to interpret statutes in favor of Native Americans than to the
avoidance canon.42 The Supreme Court explicitly created the immigration rule of lenity
in 1948 in a case that did not raise constitutional concerns, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,43 on
the theory that “because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile,” deportation provisions should be strictly construed in favor of the
alien.44 Courts have continued to apply the canon without regard to the presence of
constitutional issues.45 For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,46 the Court cited the

40

See Motomura, supra note 4, at 601.
The canon has typically been described as being applicable to “deportation” provisions, but it has been
applied in a broader manner, including in cases involving the interpretation of provisions applicable only to
excludable aliens. See Slocum, supra note 30, at 523. See also Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129,
1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the “briefs of aliens seeking refugee status must be reviewed with lenity
and any ambiguities must be resolved in their favor” in the same way that statutes are to be construed in
favor of aliens).
42
See Slocum, supra note 30, at 557-58; see also Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in
Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 439-40, 445-46 (2005) (describing how Chief Justice
Marshall created “powerful” canons in order to protect tribes even though Congress had plenary power
over Indian affairs as a constitutional matter).
43
333 U.S. 6 (1948).
44
Id. at 10. In construing an ambiguous statute which provided for the deportation of aliens convicted of
certain crimes in favor of the alien, the Court stated that “since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress means to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required
by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Id.
45
See Slocum, supra note 30, at 521 n.23 (listing cases). The Court does not always remember the canon,
however. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (explaining that if a statute has criminal
applications, “the rule of lenity applies” to the Court's interpretation of the statute even in immigration
cases “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a
criminal or noncriminal context”).
41
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canon when interpreting the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum, and in INS v.
Errico,47 the Court cited the canon when interpreting a statute that provided relief from
deportation.

2.

Other Canons

Other canons in addition to the immigration rule of lenity are frequently applied
by courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens in cases that do not involve any
constitutional issues. Due to the frequency with which Congress enacts immigration
legislation with possible retroactive effects, the presumption against retroactivity has
often been considered by courts in immigration cases. Congressional enactments that
operate retroactively do not violate the Constitution.48 The presumption against
retroactivity is a demanding canon to overcome, however, and requires statutory
language that is “so clear that it could sustain only one interpretation” before statutes will
be given retroactive effect.49 In INS v. St. Cyr,50 for example, the Court held that
provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199651 (“AEDPA”)
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199652
(“IIRIRA”) that repealed discretionary relief from deportation did not apply retroactively
46

480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966). See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (citing “the longstanding
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien . . . .” when
interpreting a provision that repealed discretionary relief from deportation); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales,
126 S.Ct. 2422, 2429-30 (2006) (quoting the language in St. Cyr that refers to the immigration rule of lenity
in describing the alien’s argument that the canon should be applied).
48
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 325 n.55 (“[O]ur decision today is fully consistent with a recognition of
Congress’ power to act retrospectively. We simply assert, as we have consistently done in the past, that in
legislating retroactively, Congress must make its intention plain.”). But see Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking
Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998) (arguing that
courts could strike down retroactive immigration provisions as a violation of due process).
49
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316-17. Although the statute must be “clear,” the Court in a recent immigration case
stated that the canon does not require that the statute contain an “express provision about temporal reach.”
Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. at 2430.
50
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
51
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1276.
47
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because the provisions lacked a “clearly expressed statement of congressional intent” that
they be applied retroactively.53
Another canon particularly relevant to immigration law is the long-standing
Charming Betsy canon, derived from the Court’s decision in Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy,54 requiring that federal statutes be construed, where reasonably possible,
not to conflict with international law.55 In addition, canons such as the presumption that
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action and the canon requiring a clear
congressional statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred are often applied
in cases that raise constitutional issues.56 Theses canons are not limited to situations
where constitutional issues are raised, however, and have also been applied in cases with
no constitutional issues.57

B.

The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the End of the
Plenary Power Doctrine

The canons described above are part of the Court’s longstanding practice of
applying canons without regard to whether any constitutional issues are raised. The
52

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
533 U.S. at 320 & n.45. See also Fernandez-Vargas, 126 S.Ct. 2422 (considering the presumption
against retroactivity to be part of its analysis of the temporal scope of an IIRIRA amendment to the INA
enlarging the provision allowing for reinstatement of prior removal orders but ultimately holding that
Congress was sufficiently clear in expressing its intent that the statute be applied to a reentry into the
United States that occurred before the effective date of IIRIRA).
54
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
55
See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 & n.28 (9th Cir. 2000) (construing statute in accordance with
international law and stating that the court would not presume that Congress intended to override
international law “when the statute can reasonably be reconciled with the law of nations”). See also Natsu
Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects, and why
U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427, 429 (2002)
(arguing that immigration law should incorporate international law). But see Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales,
423 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (questioning whether the canon “can influence the construction and
application of even ambiguous statutes . . . .”).
56
See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298-300 (citing both canons in a case that raised a constitutional issue).
57
See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text (describing a situation where the canon requiring a clear
congressional statement before habeas jurisdiction will be barred was applied where no constitutional
issues were raised); Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 (1993) (citing the
53
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avoidance canon is different in the sense that its (proper) application is tied to the extent
to which the plenary power doctrine allows constitutional challenges to be considered in
immigration cases. The canon is implicated if the government’s interpretation of a statute
“would raise serious constitutional problems” and “an alternative interpretation of a
statute is ‘fairly possible.’”58 Currently, in several areas of immigration law, the plenary
power doctrine does not prevent courts from considering constitutional challenges to
immigration provisions.59 If the plenary power doctrine foreclosed constitutional
challenges, however, there would be little legitimate role for the avoidance canon.
Although the legitimate use of the avoidance canon depends on the scope of the
plenary power doctrine, the avoidance canon is a not a product of the plenary power
doctrine. It is a canon of general application that is not specific to immigration law. The
Court considers the validity of the canon to be “beyond debate” and believes that
applying the canon helps enact congressional intent because Congress would prefer the
statutory interpretation that does not raise constitutional doubts.60 Ending the plenary
power doctrine would thus not render the avoidance canon unnecessary. Rather, it would
expand, perhaps greatly, the potential for legitimate application of the avoidance canon
because there would be more constitutional issues to avoid.61 Thus, as long as courts are
willing to recognize at least some constitutional constraints on Congress, the avoidance

presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action in preserving judicial review of
a challenge to a legalization program).
58
St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 299-300.
59
See infra Part III (describing the current scope of the plenary power doctrine and outlining areas where
successful constitutional challenges can be made).
60
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005). See also infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text
(discussing whether the canon is consistent with congressional intent)..
61
The avoidance canon is only applicable if a statue lacks clarity. If the constitutional rules are clear,
however unlikely this may be, and Congress drafts legislation with the rules in mind, such a potential
increase in the use of the avoidance canon could be diminished. See infra Part V.B. (describing the theory
that Congress legislates in light of legal constraints).
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canon should be viewed as a permanent member of the substantive canons that courts use
to interpret immigration statutes.
Furthermore, instead of viewing the usefulness of the avoidance canon as being
tied to the existence of the plenary power doctrine, those supporting greater constitutional
rights for aliens should support the permanent role of the avoidance canon.62 Even if new
constitutional rights were created in theory, constitutional rights are systematically
"underenforced" by the judiciary.63 This is especially true in immigration law.64 The
avoidance canon allows courts to vindicate constitutional principles by narrowing
questionable but not necessarily invalid statutes.65 Supporters of judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights for aliens should therefore support the avoidance canon. In any case,
the application of the avoidance canon would not be diminished by granting greater
constitutional rights to aliens. Instead, use of the canon would likely be increased,
possibly significantly.

II.

Canons Produce Both Second-Best Interpretations and
Predictability in Immigration Law
Canons have a permanent place in immigration law, but any defense of canons

must concede that they have not always been applied in a proper manner. Often the
criticism is that certain canons have been underutilized by courts in immigration cases.
62

See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text for further discussion of the desirability gains for aliens
coming through statutory rather than constitutional decisions.
63
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2113 (2005) (noting that courts
underenforce constitutional rights for good reasons, including “courts' limited factfinding capacities, their
weak democratic pedigree, their limited legitimacy, and their likely ineffectiveness as frequent instigators
of social reform”).
64
One theory of the plenary power doctrine is that aliens have constitutional rights but courts do not
enforce them. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 377
(2004). Even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, it is uncertain that courts would vigorously
recognize and enforce constitutional rights in immigration cases. See infra note 222.
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Both the presumption against retroactivity and the Charming Betsy canon have arguably
not been applied in cases where application was warranted.66 Other immigration canons
are likely similarly underutilized. As compared to clear statement rules like the canon
requiring a clear congressional statement before habeas corpus jurisdiction will be barred,
underutilization is probably particularly true with regard to weaker, tie-breaker canons,
such as the immigration rule of lenity, that are only considered when a court finds a
statute to be ambiguous at the end of its search for statutory meaning.67 In cases of
underutilization, the solution is simple: courts should apply the canons more often. In
fact, courts should apply canons in every case where application is warranted.68
In contrast to the canons that are underutilized, the avoidance canon has been
accused, most prominently by Professor Motomura, of being overutilized by courts.
Professor Motomura is correct that the avoidance canon is overutilized in immigration
cases when courts apply it in order to avoid constitutional issues that are really based on
phantom constitutional norms and are thus not “serious.”69 As part of his analysis,
however, Professor Motomura states that sometimes a statutory decision “can incorporate
a phantom constitutional norm only by going beyond reasonable readings of a [statutory]
text. Phantom norm decisionmaking may help some aliens when a case evokes
65

See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 468-69 (1987).
This function of the avoidance canon is especially powerful considering that the canon often requires courts
to adopt second-best interpretations. See infra Part II.A.
66
See, e.g., Michael G. Heyman, Immigration Law in the Supreme Court: The Flagging Spirit of the Law,
28 J. LEGIS. 113, 134-37 (2002) (arguing that the Court has ignored the Charming Betsy canon in
immigration cases); Comment, Vashti D. Van Wyke, Retroactivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr:
Emerging Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2006) (arguing that courts have neglected to
apply the presumption against retroactivity in cases where it has been applicable).
67
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 341 (2000). Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1985) (stating that the criminal rule of lenity
“survives more as a makeweight for results that seem right on other grounds than as a consistent policy of
statutory interpretation”).
68
See infra note 108 (explaining that whether a canon is applicable requires a judgment call by the court).
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sympathy, but we cannot predict those situations.”70 Professor Motomura’s analysis
conflates two separate aspects of the avoidance canon and fails to appreciate that the
application of the canon in any given case raises two distinct issues that should not be
confused. The issue of whether courts use the avoidance canon to avoid serious
constitutional issues must be analyzed separately from a second issue of whether courts
use the avoidance canon as a tool for producing legitimate statutory interpretations. The
conflation of these two issues exaggerates the overutilization of the avoidance canon and
creates a false impression that the canon (and likely canons in general) inherently creates
unpredictability in immigration law.71
This Part explains how the application of the avoidance canon often produces
second-best interpretations. These second-best interpretations are part of the legitimate
functioning of the avoidance canon and, while aggressive, cannot be viewed as examples
of overutilization. This Part then argues that these interpretations, and those produced by
canons generally, do not add unpredictability to immigration law.

A.

Jean v. Nelson and the Inherent Nature of Second-Best
Interpretations

Professor Motomura points to the Court’s decision in Jean v. Nelson72 as an
example of a case where the Court went beyond a reasonable reading of the statute in
order to avoid a serious constitutional issue that was in reality based on a phantom
constitutional norm.73 In Jean, the Court avoided the issue of whether INS parole

69

See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (explaining the phantom norms theory).
See Motomura, supra note 4, at 587, 601.
71
Undoubtedly, there are other examples where canons are overutilized. See infra note 281 (describing one
such example). This Article only focuses on the one most relevant to immigration law and that is the
subject of the most confusion.
72
472 U.S. 846 (1985).
73
See Motomura, supra note 4, at 604.
70
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decisions based on race and national origin violated the Constitution by holding that the
relevant statutes and regulations provided for nondiscriminatory parole consideration.74
Professor Motomura believes that the Jean decision was based on a phantom
constitutional norm because “the Court has never held an immigration classification
unconstitutional on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of race or national
origin.”75
While Professor Motomura’s criticism of Jean as a decision relying on a phantom
constitutional norm may be well-deserved, his criticism of Jean as a statutory
interpretation decision that incorrectly went beyond any reasonable reading of the statute
is less so.76 The Court has recently stated that the avoidance canon’s function is to
“choos[e] among plausible meanings of an ambiguous statute,” as opposed to a clear
statement rule that “implies a special substantive limit on the application of an otherwise
unambiguous mandate.”77 Nevertheless, applying the avoidance canon requires a court to
sometimes adopt the second-best interpretation; one that is, in the Court’s words, “fairly

74

472 U.S. at 848.
Motomura, supra note 4, at 593.
76
Part III.B. questions whether Jean would still be a phantom norms decision if were decided under the
current version of the plenary power doctrine. It is not clear, however, that the decision in Jean was driven
by constitutional concerns. The Court did not state that its interpretations were made in order to avoid
constitutional issues raised by an interpretation of the statutes and regulations that would allow for
discriminatory parole decisions. Rather, the Court held that it would not consider any constitutional issues
because it was obliged to resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds if possible. Courts decide cases on
constitutional grounds only as a “last resort” when there are no other grounds to decide the case. See
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1574 (2000). Thus, a court that decides a case on statutory grounds instead of
constitutional grounds is not necessarily implying that a broad interpretation of the statute in question
would raise serious constitutional concerns. In contrast, a court applying the avoidance canon is
necessarily holding that a broad interpretation of the statute would raise serious constitutional issues. See
id. at 1575.
77
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 125 S.Ct. 2169, 2183 (2005). See also Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when,
after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one
construction.”). It has been described as a clear statement canon by some, however. See ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 8, at 599.
75
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possible” but not the best interpretation.78 The canon would not be particularly useful if
it compelled a court to adopt a statutory interpretation that would avoid a serious
constitutional issue only if that interpretation was the most persuasive one.79 Likewise,
the canon would not be particularly useful if a court required that the two competing
interpretations be equally plausible—a 50-50 toss up—before it would apply the canon.80
In such a (relatively rare) case, the court could just apply a tie-breaker canon like the
immigration rule of lenity.81
With the understanding that the avoidance canon sometimes requires a court to
accept a second-best interpretation, the Jean decision can be seen as an exercise in
legitimate, albeit aggressive, interpretation that is not dissimilar to other decisions by the
Court involving the avoidance canon.82 The parole statute at issue in Jean gave the
Attorney General discretionary authority to parole aliens into the country for “urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit reasons,” with no other explicit
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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). See also William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 840 (2001) (describing the Court’s long
held view that when applying the avoidance canon “a court should prefer a permissible, even if not an
optimal, reading of the statute to which it can give effect to a pure statutory reading that it must strike
down”).
79
Such an application would render the canon superfluous because the Court has a separate doctrine that
requires courts to avoid deciding constitutional issues if a case can be decided on non-constitutional
grounds. See supra note 76. See also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 270 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
80
It is the rare case where the two competing interpretations are equally plausible. Far more often, even in
cases where courts state that a statutory provision is ambiguous, one interpretation is at least slightly more
persuasive than the next most persuasive interpretation (51-49, for example). Courts have not resolved the
issue of how persuasive the second most persuasive interpretation must be in order to label a statutory
provision “ambiguous,” see supra note 31, but surely a statute can be considered ambiguous without the
competing interpretations being equally plausible.
81
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (discussing the immigration rule of lenity).
82
Apart from the issue of whether the court believed that it was avoiding a serious constitutional issue, see
supra note 76, the Jean decision was not strictly an exercise in statutory interpretation. INS regulations
provided a list of neutral criteria for the granting of parole, which the Court and the INS interpreted as
prohibiting the consideration of race and national origin in the parole decisions. 472 U.S. at 850-51. The
Court relied, at least in part, on the INS regulations in holding that racial discrimination was prohibited.
See id. at 855. The government also argued that it did not have statutory or regulatory authority to consider
race or national origin, which undoubtedly made the interpretations much easier for the Court.
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limitations.83 As stated above, the Court believes that the avoidance canon resolves
statutory ambiguity but does not “impl[y] limitations on otherwise unambiguous text.”84
Applications of the avoidance canon, and the consequent adoption of second-best
interpretations, sometimes involves the Court creating exceptions to broad statutes or
drafting language to insert into the statute at issue, however.
One recent example of this came in Zadvydas v. Davis,85 where the Court utilized
the avoidance canon in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states only that certain
aliens “may be detained beyond the [90 day] removal period . . . .”86 Because the
government’s interpretation of the statute raised a serious constitutional issue by allowing
the government to definitely detain aliens who legally are considered to have entered the
country,87 the Court invoked the avoidance canon.88 There was no explicit limitation in
the statute regarding the length of permitted detention. Nevertheless, the Court, required
by the avoidance canon to adopt a "fairly possible" interpretation of the statue which
would avoid the constitutional questions, “read an implicit limitation into the statute.”89
The Court, “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” decided that
83

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Spector, 125 S.Ct. at 2183.
85
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
86
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
87
This is in contrast to aliens who are physically within the United States but are considered under the
“entry fiction” to have been stopped at the border. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text
(describing the difference between the two classes).
88
533 U.S. at 689.
89
Id. at 689, 701. The Court did make a perfunctory pass at claiming that the statute was ambiguous. See
id. at 697 (“But while ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion. In
that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”). Under such a mode of interpretation, the parole statute at
issue in Jean, which stated that the Attorney General “may [] in his discretion parole” “only on a case-bycase basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” is at least as ambiguous as the
statute in Zadvydas. By stating the criteria that the Attorney General should consider in determining
whether to grant parole, humanitarian or public benefit reasons, the statute could reasonably be interpreted
as precluding the Attorney General from denying parole in cases where humanitarian or public benefit
reasons were present but the Attorney General denied parole solely for reasons that are clearly contrary to
the public benefit, such as racial discrimination. Such an interpretation is at least as plausible as the
implied six-month limitation on the length of detention that the Court imposed in Zadvydas.
84
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these aliens can only be detained for a six month period unless there is a “significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”90
As the Jean and Zadvydas decisions illustrate, the Court will create exceptions to
broad statutory language in order to avoid serious constitutional questions.91 These
exceptions are often second-best interpretations of the statutes. Indeed, the Court in
Zadvydas recognized that its interpretation was not necessarily the most persuasive
interpretation available.92 The Court placed its second-best interpretation in the context
of other avoidance cases, however, asserting that it has in the past “read significant
limitations into other immigration statutes in order to avoid their constitutional
invalidation.”93 The Court thus made clear that second-best statutory interpretations,
even aggressive ones, are part of the legitimate application of the avoidance canon and
thus should not be seen as overutilization of the canon.94
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Id. at 701.
Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A disturbing number of this
Court’s cases have applied the canon of constitutional doubt to statutes that were on their face clear.”).
92
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (stating that “[t]he Government argues that the statute means what it
literally says”); Martinez, 543 U.S. at 378 (“As the Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be
construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite detention . . . .”).
93
533 U.S. at 689. The Court cited to its decision in United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957),
where the Court interpreted a provision of the INA allowing the Attorney General to require aliens under
supervision with a final order of deportation to give the Attorney General any information “as the Attorney
General may deem fit and proper,” “whether or not” the information was related to the supervision. Id. at
195. In order to avoid a serious constitutional issue, the Court limited the broad statutory language to only
allow the Attorney General authority to require information “reasonably calculated to keep the Attorney
General advised regarding the continued availability for departure of aliens whose deportation is overdue.”
Id. at 202. The Court reasoned that “[a] restrictive meaning, for what appear to be plain [statutory] words
may be indicated by . . . the rule of constitutional adjudication . . . that such a restrictive meaning must be
given if broader meaning would generate constitutional doubts.” Id. at 199. Lower courts have made
similar interpretations. See, e.g., Shokeh v. Thompson, 369 F.3d 865, 871-72 (5th Cir. 2004) (interpreting
a statute to include a reasonableness component for the amount of bond to release an alien from detention);
Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 270 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to “include an implicit
requirement that removal proceedings be concluded within a reasonable time . . . .”).
94
As stated above, these aggressive interpretations are independent of whether the constitutional issue
being avoided is a “phantom” one. For example, the Zadvydas decision, which adopted a second-best
statutory interpretation, was not based on a “phantom” norm. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying
text.
91
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B.

The Predictability of Canons

The discussion above focused on the inherent nature of the avoidance canon as
requiring courts to sometimes adopt second-best interpretations, but second-best
interpretations are not particular to the avoidance canon. Indeed, they should be viewed
as being a part of any canon stronger than a tie-breaker canon, including clear statement
canons such as the canon requiring a clear congressional statement before habeas corpus
jurisdiction will be barred.95 For example, in a recent immigration case, Demore v.
Kim,96 the Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider Kim’s habeas corpus challenge
to his detention pending his removal hearing. In the Court’s view, the relevant provision,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), did not contain “a superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement
for the congressional expression of” an intent to preclude habeas review.97 Obviously, by
requiring the government to meet such a difficult burden of proof, the Court was willing
to accept a second-best interpretation of the statute.
These second-best interpretations do not necessarily make statutory decisions that
apply canons unpredictable. If applied correctly and consistently, well-established
canons can act as background rules that guide Congress by sending signals about how
statutes will be interpreted.98 The Court has endorsed this theory, stating in an
immigration case, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,99 that “[i]t is presumable that
Congress legislates with knowledge of our basic rules of statutory construction.”100
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See supra note 31 (describing how canons are not all triggered by the same level of uncertainty).
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
97
Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
98
See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 125, (2001);
Schacter, supra note 33, at 600 (arguing that this is the best theory of the compatability of canons with
legislative supremacy).
99
498 U.S. 479 (1991).
100
Id. at 496. It therefore followed that “given [the Court’s] well-settled presumption favoring
interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,” a statute precluding direct
96
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The recent history of habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration cases is a good
example of the background rules theory at work. In 1996, Congress passed AEDPA and
IIRIRA which made significant changes to the judicial review provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).101 In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court, after applying
the avoidance canon, the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action
and the “the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to
repeal habeas jurisdiction,” rejected the government’s argument that Congress had clearly
divested courts of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus actions filed by
criminal aliens to challenge removal orders.102
In response to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr, Congress passed the REAL ID Act
of 2005.103 Lower courts have found that the new law eliminates habeas corpus review of
final removal orders by providing that petitions for review in the federal courts of appeals
are the exclusive path into court.104 Unlike the provisions enacted in IIRIRA, the
amendments made by the REAL ID Act bear the influence of the Court’s command in St.
Cyr that congressional repeals of habeas must be worded clearly, explicitly referencing
28 U.S.C. § 2241 “or any other habeas corpus provision.”105 Presumably, Congress will

review of the decisions of the INS denying applications for Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) status
would not deprive courts of considering due process challenges to the manner in which SAW provisions
were administered by the INS. Id.
101
See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000).
102
533 U.S. at 299.
103
Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). See also infra notes 223-29 and
accompanying text (discussing the REAL ID Act and judicial review).
104
See, e.g., Haider v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 902, 910 (8th Cir. 2006).
105
§ 106(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 311. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction
Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 465 (2006) (discussing the lack of similarly
clear language in AEDPA and IIRIRA). Like other provisions purporting to strip courts of habeas corpus
jurisdiction, the REAL ID Act is likely to be narrowly interpreted, however. See, e.g., Nadarajah v.
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the Act as not precluding habeas corpus
review in cases that do not involve a final order of removal).
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be similarly explicit hereafter when it intends to preclude courts from exercising
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions.106
While canons can add predictability to the law when used correctly, they are only
as legitimate as the courts applying them. It is true that courts have used canons in an
inconsistent, and thus unpredictable, manner. Courts underutilize some canons and have
overutilized others, such as the avoidance canon.107 Even when canons are applied in
good faith by courts, statutory interpretation decisions are based on the context of the
case and therefore can be seen as unpredictable in the sense that the outcome of the case,
at least in close cases, cannot be known for certain before the case is decided.108
Professor Motomura argues that application of canons in immigration law has
been unpredictable and that courts should instead decide cases on constitutional grounds,
but any inherent unpredictability in canons should not devalue them, at least as compared
to constitutional decisions. Constitutional decisions, even when the rules to be applied
are clear, can be just as unpredictable as statutory decisions.109 The Nguyen v. INS110
case is a good example of how abandoning the plenary power doctrine would not
necessarily add predictability to immigration law. In Nguyen, the Court purported to
106

Cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2210 (2002)
(stating that using the avoidance canon to interpret ambiguous statutes “usefully results in more precise
legislation”). Thus, while St. Cyr may have involved a second-best interpretation, Congress learned from
the decision just how explicitly the Court requires that a statute revoking habeas corpus jurisdiction be
worded. If the Court continues to apply canons consistently, and Congress continues to follow the
guidance of the Court, the need for second-best interpretations would diminish.
107
See infra Part III (discussing the overutilization of the avoidance canon).
108
The determination of when the application of a canon is warranted is a judgment call requiring a finding
that there is statutory uncertainty. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Even if a court finds a
statutory provision to be clear and declines to apply a canon, some may disagree and accuse the court of
underutilizing the canon. The proper application of canons thus relies on the good faith interpretations of
judges, which are not easily categorized as involving over- or underutilization of canons.
109
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1381-82 (2006) (asserting that the Rehnquist Court’s “headscratching unpredictability in many important areas of constitutional law had less to do with shifting (or
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apply mainstream, heightened scrutiny review to an immigration provision that explicitly
discriminated on the basis of gender.111 Despite the weakness of the justifications for the
discrimination, the Court upheld the provision.112 The decision is perhaps not as
surprising as it would seem. In a recent article, Professor Winkler shows that even the
Court’s application of the strict scrutiny standard depends heavily on context and in some
areas of law does not result in invalidation in a significant percentage of cases.113
I am not attempting to prove that statutory decisions are more predictable than
constitutional ones. It does seem clear, however, that canons do not add unpredictability
to statutory interpretation and the law in a way that is somehow novel. Rather,
unpredictability should be seen as more of a perennial concern, to the extent it is a
concern, about law in general than one that is specific to canons.

III.

The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the Plenary
Power Doctrine
While overutilization of the avoidance canon cannot be blamed second-best

statutory interpretations, the Court has overused the canon, through phantom
constitutional norms reasoning, to avoid constitutional issues that were not serious.114
The potential for courts to overutilize the avoidance canon in immigration cases through
phantom norms reasoning will always exist, of course. Unlike second-best
interpretations, though, phantom norms decisions are not a necessary part of the

moderating) philosophies on the part of the Justices and more to do with its flexible, case-by-case approach
to constitutional interpretation”).
110
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
111
But see Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 835, 836 (2002) (arguing that the Nguyen Court was implicitly taking the immigration
context into account even while it expressly denied doing so).
112
See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the decision).
113
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, VAND. L. REV. (2006) (will add citations when article appears on Westlaw).
114
See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
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application of the avoidance canon in immigration cases. Recent decisions by the Court
reveal that the plenary power doctrine, while still viable, is sufficiently weak now that the
application of the avoidance canon in several areas of immigration law does not have to
involve a phantom constitutional norm. This Part first describes the current status of the
plenary power doctrine and then outlines a number of important areas in immigration law
where the avoidance canon can be, and has been, legitimately applied by courts.

A.

The Status of the Plenary Power Doctrine

In the first immigration cases, the Court seemed to assert that immigration
legislation would not be subjected by courts to constitutional constraints.115 Eventually, a
significant exception to the plenary power doctrine emerged. This exception was
applicable only to deportable aliens, those aliens who had been deemed under
immigration law to have entered the United States.116 For these aliens, courts limited the
plenary power doctrine to "substantive" criteria for admission and expulsion, while
applying mainstream constitutional principles to "procedural" matters such as deportation
hearings.117
Notwithstanding the procedural due process exception for deportable aliens, and
despite constant criticism from commentators, the plenary power doctrine remained
115

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts,
22 CONST. L. Q. 925, 926 (1995); Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 862 (stating that early cases “denied virtually
any authority for the judiciary to review substantive decisions as to which classes of aliens should be
entitled to enter or remain in the country”).
116
See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text (describing the entry doctrine).
117
The Court in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982), described the distinction between aliens who
had entered the country (and thus were entitled to a hearing that comported with procedural due process)
and those who had not as follows: “[A]n alien seeking admission to the United States requests a privilege
and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a
sovereign prerogative . . . However, once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the
ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.” Id. at 32. Some
courts have narrowed the scope of the plenary power doctrine by casting constitutional challenges as
procedural rather than substantive. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of
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largely untouched by the Supreme Court for most of the twentieth century.118 By the end
of the twentieth century, however, some scholars, including Professor Motomura,
described what they viewed as a weakening of the plenary power doctrine. The
diminishment of the doctrine came through exceptions to it, such as a broadening of the
due process exception, and a willingness of courts to subject statutes to a rational basis
test instead of a complete bar to judicial review.119 Some scholars even predicted the
eventual demise of the plenary power doctrine.120
Those predicting the end of the plenary power doctrine are certainly correct to the
extent that the plenary power doctrine no longer forecloses, if it ever did, judicial review
of immigration statutes.121 The Court now reviews the constitutionality of governmental
actions, although it has mostly done so under a lenient rational basis standard.122
Similarly, lower courts consistently apply the rational basis standard to both equal
protection and substantive due process challenges.123 Courts have invalidated
immigration provisions under the rational basis standard of review, but generally the
classification invalidated has been viewed by the court as an interpretation of a statute
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625
(1992).
118
See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 865; Schuck, supra note 22, at 1 (stating that “[i]n a legal firmament
transformed by revolutions in due process and equal protection doctrine and by a new conception of
judicial role, immigration law remains the realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and
individual entitlement is at the nadir”).
119
See Motomura, supra note 4, at 608 (describing how lower courts created a rational basis test);
Legomsky, supra note 115, at 931-37 (describing the “mild rational basis test” that had been developed by
courts).
120
See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 257 (2000)
(arguing that shifts in the international context augur the end of the plenary power doctrine); Legomsky,
supra note 115, at 934-37 (predicting that the plenary power doctrine will “wear away by attrition”).
121
This is true at least to the extent that the statutes regulate deportable aliens. Inadmissible aliens have
traditionally been without constitutional protection, although some lower courts have questioned this
doctrine. See infra note 138.
122
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
123
See, e.g., Cordes v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the “disparate treatment of
similarly situated aliens under the immigration laws implicates the guarantee of equal protection”); Rojas-
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made by the Board of Immigration Appeals or the INS rather than a classification made
explicit by Congress.124
While it is well-established, at least in the lower courts, that rational basis scrutiny
can be applied to immigration statutes, it is no longer clear that the plenary power
doctrine always precludes the application of a more stringent standard of review when a
statute infringes fundamental rights or raises equal protection concerns.125 In 2001, in
Nguyen v. INS,126 the Court upheld a provision in the INA that more generously conferred
birth citizenship on the out-of-wedlock children of American citizen mothers than those
of American citizen fathers.127 In contrast to its earlier decision in a similar case, Fiallo
v. Bell,128 in Nguyen the Court purported to apply the standard equal protection analysis
for gender-based classifications. The Court explicitly refused to rely on the plenary
power precedents in upholding the provision, disclaiming any need to “assess the
implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference afforded to
Congress in the exercise of it s immigration and naturalization power.”129 In another

Reyes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying the rational basis standard to a substantive due
process challenge).
124
See, e.g., Cordes, 421 F.3d at 896 (striking down the “INS’ decision” to “afford section 212(c) relief” to
some permanent resident residents but not others); Servine-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.
2002) (striking down an INS policy of allowing inadmissible aliens but not deportable aliens to apply for
discretionary relief from deportation); Dillingham v. INS, 267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking down a
BIA decision not to recognize foreign expungements for simple drug possession offenses); Garberding v.
INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) (striking down a BIA decision not to recognize an expungement of a
state conviction).
125
Cf. Flores-Ledezma v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying the rational basis test
because the classification did not “involve fundamental rights and did not proceed along suspect lines”).
126
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
127
The same constitutional challenge had been before the Court in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998),
but the case was decided on the basis of standing. In dicta, however, five members of the Court indicated
that the provision was unconstitutional. See Pillard, supra note 111, at 836.
128
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
129
533 U.S. at 72-73; see also Pillard, supra note 111, at 845 (“At least superficially, the Nguyen decision
reads . . . not like a decision about immigration and naturalization, but like a conventional sex
discrimination case.”). One theory that would distinguish Nguyen from traditional immigration cases is
that the plenary power doctrine is inapplicable when the case involves a claim of citizenship at birth and
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decision from 2001, Zadvydas, the Court stated that the government’s exercise of its
immigration power was subject to “important constitutional limitations,” and applied the
same due process analysis to the detention of aliens as it would have to the detention of
citizens.130 Together, these two cases contributed to the perception, at least temporarily,
that the plenary power doctrine was substantially weakened, if not ended entirely. 131
The Zadvydas and Nguyen decisions may be evidence of the further weakening of
the plenary power doctrine, but the Court’s recent decision in Demore v. Kim132
establishes that the plenary power doctrine is still viable. In Kim, the Court held that the
mandatory detention of criminal resident aliens pending their deportation hearings does
not violate due process.133 The Court stated that detention is "a constitutionally valid
aspect of the deportation process" and used the classic plenary power reasoning that "[i]n
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."134 The Court
distinguished Zadvydas, implying that Zadvydas, unlike Kim, was not really an
immigration case and therefore not subject to the plenary power doctrine. The potentially
thus could be said to involve a citizen and not an alien. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 480-81 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96-97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
130
533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). See also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court in Zadvydas disagreed with the idea that “the constitutionally protected liberty
interest in avoiding physical confinement, even for aliens already ordered removed, was conceptually
different from the liberty interest of citizens”); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017
(2002) (noting that the Zadvydas Court "applied to immigration detention the due process principles
generated in civil detention cases outside the immigration context, without any suggestion that a different
due process analysis should apply"). See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (describing the
Zadvydas decision).
131
See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law: D. Due Process, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 287, 297 (2003) (“When the Supreme Court decided Zadvydas two years ago, legal scholars
celebrated the case as an important step toward the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine.”). Cf. T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 365, 366 (2002) (stating that the case “may represent a radical shift” but concluding that it is
“unlikely to present the death knell for the plenary power doctrine”).
132
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 521, 531.
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indefinite detention in Zadvydas “did not serve its purported immigration purpose”
because it affected aliens for whom removal was "no longer practically attainable" due to
the aliens’ native countries refusing to accept their return.135 In contrast, the detention in
Kim "necessarily serve[d] the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings."136

B.

The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and “Phantom”
Constitutional Norms

Because the plenary power doctrine has at least some continuing vitality, in order
to avoid the problem of “phantom” constitutional norms, use of the avoidance canon in
immigration law must still account for the deference given the government when
constitutional challenges are made. As discussed above, the plenary power doctrine has
weakened, however. There is more room for legitimate use of the avoidance canon in
immigration law than ever before.
Despite the continued existence of the plenary power doctrine, there are areas of
constitutional concern where the rules applied to immigration provisions do not differ
from those applicable to non-immigration provisions. For example, it is well-established
that courts will consider procedural due process challenges by deportable aliens.137 Some
lower courts have held that even inadmissible aliens, those aliens deemed by the law not
to have entered the country, have due process rights.138 Lower courts have thus properly
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Id. at 527. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (suggesting that the absence of likely removal makes the
detention less immigration related and thus affects the extent to which the plenary power doctrine applies).
136
538 U.S. at 528.
137
See supra note 117.
138
See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (“The fact that excludable
aliens are entitled to less process . . . does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003).
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applied the avoidance canon in order to avoid serious due process issues, including ones
involving the availability of judicial review.139
Similar to procedural due process challenges, the government does not receive the
benefit of the plenary power doctrine in cases involving a claim that a statute violates a
structural provision of the Constitution rather than an amendment to the Constitution.
For example, in INS v. Chadha,140 the Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional
as a violation of the Constitution's structural requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. The Court reasoned that it could review whether "Congress has chosen a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing [its] power" over immigration.141
Similarly, in St. Cyr, the Court ignored the plenary power doctrine in holding that
removal of habeas corpus authority by Congress would raise serious constitutional issues
involving the Suspension Clause.142
Courts have also entertained challenges to “non-substantive” immigration laws
without according any special deference to the government. For example, in Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft,143 the Sixth Circuit explained that “substantive immigration laws
answer the questions, ‘who is allowed entry’ or ‘who can be deported’” in finding a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings.144 The distinction drawn by the
Sixth Circuit between substantive and non-substantive provisions may not be a valid one,
139

See, e.g., Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a statute to
allow for judicial review because a statute precluding judicial review “would raise serious constitutional
concerns because it would potentially deprive an alien of the full and fair hearing guaranteed to him by the
Constitution”); United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We have recently held that an
erroneous denial of the opportunity to apply for § 212(c) relief may constitute a due process violation.”).
140
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
141
Id. at 940-41.
142
533 U.S. 289, 300 (2001). See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v.
St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 563 (2002) (explaining that the plenary power doctrine played
no explicit role in St. Cyr).
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303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2003).
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however, after the Court’s decision in Kim, which relied on the plenary power doctrine in
upholding a non-substantive immigration provision.145
Even in areas where the government sometimes receives deference under the
plenary power doctrine, application of the avoidance canon can be legitimate.
Substantive due process challenges, at least to the extent they are connected to the
detention of deportable aliens,146 are one such example. It could be argued that Zadvydas
and Kim fit Professor Motomura’s phantom constitutional norms pattern.147 First, the
Court in Zadvydas identified a serious constitutional issue raised by the possibility of
indefinite detention of aliens when there is no realistic prospect of deportation. Instead of
deciding the constitutional issue, the Court avoided it by applying the avoidance canon
and interpreting the relevant statute narrowly.148 Second, the Court in Kim declined to
apply the constitutional norm identified in Zadvydas when it was forced to directly
address the constitutionality of detention.149
Such an interpretation of Zadvydas and Kim, while possible, is not the best
interpretation of the cases. The constitutional norm identified in Zadvydas does not
appear to be a phantom norm. Zadvydas was not the first case to assert that aliens have
substantive due process rights that are implicated by detention. In Reno v. Flores,150 the
Court upheld regulations governing the detention of juvenile aliens but indicated that the
plenary power doctrine would not protect the regulations from substantive due process
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Id. at 687-88 (claiming that “[t]he Supreme Court has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully
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See infra notes 172-94 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between inadmissible and
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review.151 Moreover, the Court in Kim seemed to accept Zadvydas as constitutional
precedent and attempted to distinguish rather than ignore the case.152 Lower courts have
likewise treated Zadvydas as a constitutional holding.153
Similar to Zadvydas, the Kim decision should not be interpreted as precluding
substantive due process challenges to detention. Although the Court in Kim upheld the
detention at issue in the case, it did not merely dismiss the constitutional challenge on the
basis of the plenary power doctrine. Indeed, the Court subjected the statute to
constitutional scrutiny, although it seemed to do so under a rational basis standard rather
than a more stringent standard of review.154 Lower courts have treated Kim as a case that
recognized that aliens have substantive due process rights that are implicated by
detention. In Ly v. Hansen,155 for example, the Sixth Circuit held that the detention of an
alien for one and one-half years pending deportation proceedings was unreasonably long
and violated the alien’s substantive due process rights.156
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Id. at 306 (citing to the plenary power doctrine but stating, "[o]f course, the INS regulation must still
meet the (unexacting) standard of rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose"). The
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at issue could not be reviewed.
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Courts can also legitimately apply the avoidance canon in at least some cases
involving equal protection claims. It is true that courts have generally not applied a
heightened standard in cases involving equal protection claims, but it is now wellestablished that such claims are subject to rational basis scrutiny.157 Under rational basis
scrutiny, provisions that discriminate on the basis of gender or race, for example, could
be seen as irrational and struck down without having to apply a heightened standard.158
The INS parole decisions at issue in Jean v. Nelson provides one possible
example where discrimination based on race and national origin could be held to violate
the Constitution under a rational basis standard. Recall that the Court avoided the
constitutional issues in Jean by deciding the case on statutory grounds.159 Professor
Motomura argues that Jean was based on a phantom constitutional norm because “the
Court has never held an immigration classification unconstitutional on the ground that it
discriminates on the basis of race or national origin.”160 It is still true that the Court has
never invalidated an immigration classification on the basis of race, but Jean would not
necessarily be a phantom norm decision if it were decided today. Courts have allowed
discrimination on the basis of national origin,161 but the Ninth Circuit has indicated that
racial discrimination in parole decisions violates the Constitution and would not survive
even a low level of constitutional scrutiny.162 Thus, the Court could avoid the
constitutional issues that would be raised by parole decisions based on invidious racial
157

See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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discrimination (as opposed to merely national origin discrimination) and hold that the
relevant statutes and regulations provide for nondiscriminatory parole consideration.
Such a determination would not be based on a phantom constitutional norm.163
Although this Section has outlined several areas where constitutional challenges
can be made in immigration cases, the plenary power doctrine is in a state of flux and no
definitive statements can be made about its current scope. Professor Legomsky’s
prediction that the plenary power doctrine will wear away little by little is perhaps being
realized.164 Based on the Court’s statement in Zadvydas that the government’s exercise
of its immigration power is subject to “important constitutional limitations,” lower courts
may increasingly be inclined to apply normal constitutional rules in immigration cases.165
Even if the plenary power doctrine is not further weakened, however, there are several
major areas in immigration law where application of the avoidance canon is legitimate
and appropriate and does not require the use of phantom constitutional norms.

IV.

A New Concern: The Lowest Common Denominator Principle
While the Court’s use of the avoidance canon was notable in the past because the

canon was sometimes applied to avoid constitutional issues that were not serious, the
Court’s recent use of the canon is notable for another reason. The Court’s recent decision
in Clark v. Martinez166 has added a new and powerful aspect to the avoidance canon by
directing that a statutory interpretation made by invoking the canon be uniformly applied
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533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). The Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim would be an obvious barrier to such
a holding, though. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
166
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
163

37

in subsequent cases even when the later cases do not raise any constitutional issues.167
The Court’s creation of what it terms the “lowest common denominator” principle is new
in the sense that courts in the past have often interpreted the same statutory language in
different ways depending on the status of the litigant before the court.168
Although the lowest common denominator principle is related to the phantom
constitutional norms problem, the two issues should not be confused.169 The lowest
common denominator principle is not specific to immigration law. In the Court’s view, it
is a legitimate and necessary consequence of the application of the avoidance canon and,
consequently, is present even when the issue avoided is genuine.170 Indeed, the Court’s
purpose in creating the lowest common denominator principle likely was not an effort to
protect aliens. Professor Siegel has theorized that the lowest common denominator
principle was adopted by the author of the Martinez decision, Justice Scalia, in an attempt
to limit the judicial discretion that would be inherent in allowing judges to choose
different interpretations for the same statutory language.171 Thus, unlike the phantom
constitutional norms problem, the issues raised by the creation of the lowest common
denominator principle are particularly relevant to immigration law but extent beyond it.
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See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
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This Part illustrates how the lowest common denominator principle can create
greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least temporarily, than if the provision in question
had been struck down on constitutional grounds. This Part also argues that the power of
the lowest common denominator principle warrants caution by courts when they apply
the avoidance canon. Courts must be particularly diligent in ensuring that the
constitutional issues are serious and the interpretation adopted is plausible, even if
second-best.

A.

Statutory Decisions That Give Aliens More Rights Than
Constitutional Decisions
1.

Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez

The creation of the lowest common denominator principle in immigration law
started with the Court’s decision in Zadvydas.172 Recall that in Zadvydas, the Court
applied the avoidance canon in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which states that
certain aliens “may be detained beyond the [90 day] removal period . . . .”173 The Court,
required by the canon to adopt a "fairly possible" interpretation of the statue that would
avoid the constitutional questions raised by the detention of aliens who legally are
considered to have entered the country, held that these aliens can only be detained for a
six month period unless there is a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.”174 Thus, as a result of the Court’s use of the avoidance canon, the
holding was one of statutory construction that was driven by constitutional concerns.
What is remarkable about the Zadvydas decision and its aftermath is that the
statutory decision in Zadvydas likely resulted in greater rights for aliens as a whole, at
172
173

533 U.S. 678 (2001).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
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least temporarily, than if the decision had rested on constitutional grounds. Prior to 1996,
there were two classes of aliens, “excludables” and “deportables.” As the Court stated in
Zadvydas, the difference between the two classes rested “upon a basic territorial
distinction."175 Excludable aliens, even ones who were physically present due to having
been “paroled” into the country by the Attorney General, were considered under the
“entry fiction” to be outside the United States and ineligible for admission or entry.176
Deportable aliens, in contrast, were those who had "entered" into the country, legally or
otherwise.177 Excludable aliens were considered to have little or no constitutional rights,
while aliens who had entered the United States had greater constitutional rights.178
On September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which changed the
terminology.179 There are still separate grounds of "inadmissibility" and "deportability,"
but the difference between the two grounds now turns on whether an alien has been
legally "admitted" to the United States, rather than on whether the alien has gained
"entry," legal or otherwise.180 While there are still statutory differences between
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533 U.S. at 701.
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inadmissible and deportable aliens, many of the provisions in the INA, including §
1231(a)(6), now apply without differentiation to both classes.
In contrast to a statute providing for the indefinite detention of deportable aliens,
which the Court in Zadvydas indicated would at the least raise serious constitutional
questions, a similar statute providing for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens
would likely be constitutional.181 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,182
which was explicitly not revisited by the Court in Zadvydas, the Court held that the
indefinite detention of a returning permanent resident alien did not violate due process
because the alien was treated "as if stopped at the border" and thus had no due process
rights at all.183 Furthermore, lower courts have consistently held that provisions
providing for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens are constitutional.184
If the Court in Zadvydas had interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) as giving the
Attorney General the authority to detain aliens indefinitely but that the indefinite
detention of deportable aliens was unconstitutional, the provision likely would have been
left partially intact and could still have been applied to the detention of inadmissible
aliens. Facial challenges are disfavored by the Court, especially when the statute at issue
can be applied constitutionally in some circumstances and has a severability clause.185

supra note 131, at 375 (noting that the Court’s opinion in Zadvydas "reaffirm[s] the border/interior
distinction as a constitutional matter”).
181
In this Article, I use the terms “inadmissible” and “excludable” interchangeably. In using the term
inadmissible, I intend for it to be understood as synonymous with excludable, even if doing so is somewhat
inaccurate, and to only include those aliens who are deemed under immigration law to have been stopped at
the border. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 375 n.2 (2005) (treating the terms inadmissible and
excludable as being equivalent).
182
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
183
Id. at 215.
184
See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
185
See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878-93 (2005).
The Court has recognized that immigration provisions are to be severed when possible. See INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983) (quoting language from the INA that “[i]f any particular provision of this Act, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the

41

Thus, the Court likely would have struck down the statute as applied but would have left
the government with the ability to apply the statute to the detention of inadmissible
aliens.
The Court did not rule that § 1231(a)(6) is unconstitutional, though. It interpreted
the statute as not giving the Attorney General the authority to indefinitely detain
deportable aliens.186 In Clark v. Martinez,187 the Court extended the Zadvydas statutory
holding to include inadmissible aliens. The Court held that § 1231(a)(6) should be
interpreted as containing the same limitations as to the detention of inadmissible aliens as
the Court in Zadvydas found were applicable to the detention of deportable aliens.188 The
Court recognized that its interpretation of § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was driven by the
avoidance canon. The Court rejected the notion, however, that it needed to determine
whether indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would raise a serious constitutional
question before it interpreted § 1231(a)(6) as not allowing for the indefinite detention of
inadmissible aliens.189 Instead, the Court stated:
It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a limiting
construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though
other of the statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the
same limitation. The lowest common denominator, as it were, must
govern, . . . whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the
particular litigant before the Court.190
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby”) (Emphasis
added).
186
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
187
543 U.S. 371 (2005).
188
See id. at 377-78. In dissent, Justice Thomas interpreted Zadvydas differently, arguing that “Zadvydas
established a single and unchanging, if implausible, meaning of § 1231(a)(6): that the detention period
authorized by § 1231(a)(6) depends not only on the circumstances surrounding a removal, but also on the
type of alien ordered removed.” Id. at 391 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189
See id. at 380-81. Significantly, the Court in Martinez did not claim that its interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas was the most persuasive interpretation available, only that the interpretation in
Zadvydas must be applied uniformly to cases involving inadmissible aliens. See supra Part II.A.
(describing how the avoidance canon sometimes requires courts to adopt second-best interpretations).
190
Id. at 724. See also Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The government has offered no
authority suggesting that a litigant may not take advantage of a statutory interpretation that was guided by
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The end result of the Zadvydas decision has thus been very broad. Before IIRIRA
replaced the previous statutory regime with § 1231(a)(6), courts almost uniformly held
that the Attorney General had both statutory and constitutional authority to indefinitely
detain inadmissible aliens.191 After the passage of IRRIRA, courts held the same.192
Even after the Zadvydas decision, some courts held that the Attorney General retained
both statutory and constitutional authority to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens.193
Due to the Court’s use of the avoidance canon in Zadvydas and the lowest common
denominator principle in Martinez, the Attorney General was precluded from detaining
indefinitely not only deportable aliens, whose indefinite detention raises serious
constitutional problems, but also inadmissible aliens, whose indefinite detention does not
raise serious constitutional problems. As a result, the Attorney General no longer had
authority to detain even inadmissible aliens who had been ordered removed well before
1996 and who had been subject to government detention procedures for over twenty
years.194

the principle of constitutional avoidance when that litigant’s case does not present the constitutional
problem that prompted the statutory interpretation.”).
191
See, e.g., Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the “overall
structure” of the INA provisions relating to excludable aliens assumed that the Attorney General had
authority to detain excludable aliens indefinitely); Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437,
1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens did not violate their
substantive or procedural due process rights). One major exception was the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 238 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that the indefinite
detention of excludable aliens violated their due process rights.
192
See, e.g., Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3rd Cir. 1999).
193
See, e.g., Sierra v. Romaine, 347 F.3d 559 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that Zadvydas’s temporal limitation
on detention does not apply to inadmissible aliens); Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003)
(concluding “that Zadvydas's six-month presumption of reasonableness is inapplicable to inadmissible
aliens”). The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the government no longer had statutory authority after
Zadvydas to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens. See Xi v. INS, 298, 832, 837-39 (9th Cir. 2002).
194
One of the aliens in Martinez arrived on the Mariel boatlift from Cuba in 1980 and was ordered removed
in 1994. 543 U.S. 371, 374-75 (2005). See also Benitez v. Wallis, 402 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2005)
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2.

INS v. St. Cyr and its Aftermath

The potential for the avoidance canon to give aliens greater rights than a decision
striking down the statutory provision in question as unconstitutional is not, of course,
limited to detention cases. The formula is simple. A court interprets a statutory
provision in favor of one group of aliens through an application of the avoidance canon.
The Court then, pursuant to the lowest common denominator principle, uniformly applies
the same interpretation in cases involving a second group of aliens even when the
alternative interpretation favoring the government would not have raised any serious
constitutional questions.195
A similar phenomenon can also be found in St. Cyr and its aftermath.196 Recall
that in St. Cyr the Court held that AEDPA and IIRIRA did not divest district courts of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 over habeas corpus actions filed by criminal aliens to
challenge their removal orders.197 In holding that habeas corpus review was still
available for criminal aliens, the Court relied on the avoidance canon because an
interpretation of the statutes “that would entirely preclude review of a pure question of
law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional questions.”198 The Court
did not rely only on the avoidance canon, however. The Court also cited the “strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action” and “the longstanding
(ordering the release of a Cuban national who came to the United States on the Mariel boatlift in 1980);
Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (same).
195
Of course, if the case involving the second group of aliens reaches court first, the court would apply the
lowest common denominator based on constitutional concerns involving the first group of aliens. See
Martinez, 543 U.S. at 724. Either way, the second group of aliens receives rights that it would not receive
under a constitutional holding.
196
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
197
Id. at 299. I use the term “criminal aliens” to refer to aliens who are alleged by the government to be
deportable on the basis of their criminal activities. “Non-criminal” aliens are those who are alleged to be
deportable on other than criminal grounds.
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rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.199
Significantly, the Court noted that “Congress could, without raising any constitutional
questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts of appeals.”200 Thus, even if
the Court had held that the review provisions in AEDPA and IIRIRA unconstitutionally
deprived criminal aliens of the ability to file habeas corpus petitions, the provisions
would have been constitutional as applied to non-criminal aliens, who can obtain review
of final orders of removal in the courts of appeals.201
Subsequent to St. Cyr, and without benefit of the Court’s decision in Martinez,
some lower courts held that the Court’s decision in St. Cyr compelled a finding that noncriminal aliens could challenge their removal orders through habeas corpus in district
court even though they, unlike criminal aliens, were able to obtain judicial review
through the review provisions set forth in the INA. The Third Circuit in Chmakov v.
Blackman202 made such a holding, explicitly refusing to adopt different interpretations of
the same statutory provisions depending on the status of the alien.203 Similarly, the
Second Circuit in Liu v. INS204 agreed with the Third Circuit that habeas jurisdiction was
not repealed for non-criminal aliens, reasoning that “St. Cyr held as a matter of statutory
construction that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and

198

Id. at 300; see also Neuman, supra note 101, at 1991 (describing the difficulties of resolving the
Suspension Clause issue).
199
533 U.S. at 298.
200
See id. at 314 n.38. See also id. at 314 (noting that “[i]f it were clear that the question of law could be
answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS’ reading” of the statute).
201
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006).
202
266 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2001).
203
Id. at 215.
204
293 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2002).
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IIRIRA. The Court’s construction of those statutes, which does not distinguish, expressly
or implicitly, between criminal and non-criminal aliens, compels our conclusion.”205

B.

The Significance of the Lowest Common Denominator
Principle in Immigration Law

The decisions described above illustrate how second-best interpretations made
through the avoidance canon can lead to greater rights for aliens as a whole, at least
temporarily, than would a decision striking down the statute as unconstitutional on an asapplied basis. Because of the lowest common denominator principle, the avoidance
canon has been transformed into an even more powerful tool for protecting aliens.206
Indeed, the effects of the lowest common denominator principle are particularly strong in
immigration law because of immigration law’s unique classifications. It is still true that
inadmissible and deportable aliens have very different constitutional rights.207 Yet, many
immigration provisions, such as the one at issue in Zadvydas, are general in scope and
apply to both deportable and inadmissible aliens. In addition, immigration law makes
other distinctions among aliens, such as the criminal, non-criminal distinction in St.

205
Id. at 40. See also Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the Third Circuit and the
Second Circuit that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed for non-criminal aliens). Not all circuit courts
agreed that the habeas route was still available to non-criminal aliens, however. See, e.g., Lee v. Gonzales,
410 F.3d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that habeas jurisdiction was not available when another avenue
of review was available). In his dissenting opinion in Martinez, Justice Thomas, pointing to the Chmakov,
Riley and Liu decisions, stated that “[t]he logic in allowing non-criminal aliens, who have a right to judicial
review of removal decisions, to take advantage of constitutional doubt that arises from precluding any
avenue of judicial review for criminal aliens . . . escapes me.” See 543 U.S. 371, 401 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
206
It appears that lower courts have treated the lowest common denominator principle seriously. See, e.g.,
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting a different set of detention
provisions than the one at issue in Zadvydas to allow detention for only a limited time, even though the
alien before the court had been stopped at the border, because deportable aliens were also subject to
detention under the same provisions).
207
See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
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Cyr.208 There are thus numerous potential opportunities for aliens, as a whole, to benefit
from the lowest common denominator principle.209
Despite the undeniable power of the lowest common denominator principle in
immigration law, its significance in immigration cases should not be overstated.
Professor Siegel argues that the lowest common denominator principle, when combined
with the avoidance canon, “rachets up the judicial interference with congressional
will.”210 This is true, however, only when a second canon in addition to the avoidance
canon is not relevant to the interpretation of the statute.
Multiple canons are often implicated in immigration cases, and in such
circumstances where a second canon is applicable in addition to the avoidance canon, the
statutory provisions should be interpreted uniformly regardless of the lowest common
denominator principle. In cases that raise serious constitutional questions, the avoidance
canon is implicated if the statutory interpretation favoring the alien is a fairly possible
interpretation, while the immigration rule of lenity, for example, is implicated whenever
an immigration statute is ambiguous.211 Thus, if an immigration provision is ambiguous
and the government’s interpretation of it would raise a serious constitutional question,
both canons direct courts to interpret the statute in favor of the alien, with the
immigration rule of lenity being applicable regardless of any constitutional concerns.

208

See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
I state that aliens “as a whole,” are benefited, but, to be more specific, the group likely to be assisted the
most by the lowest common denominator principle are inadmissible aliens. In many cases where a court
avoids a constitutional claim brought by a deportable alien, it is still likely that the constitutional challenge
would not have been a serious one if it had been made by an inadmissible alien. Yet, under the lowest
common denominator principle, the statutory provision must be interpreted uniformly.
210
See Siegel, supra note 168, at 382. See also Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 207 F.Supp.2d 326, 334 (D. N.J.
2002) (arguing that the idea that a Supreme Court interpretation avoiding serious constitutional questions
applies to every conceivable application of the statute would dramatically expand the power of the courts at
the expense of Congress).
211
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of lenity).
209
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The presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action, the canon requiring
a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction, and the Charming
Betsy canon can also be applicable in cases that raise serious constitutional issues.212
In Zadvydas, it is perhaps true that only the avoidance canon was relevant,
although the Court did state that the statutory provision in question, 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), was ambiguous.213 It is possible, however, that the statutory provision was
sufficiently unclear that the avoidance canon could be applied but not so ambiguous that
the immigration rule of lenity, a tie-breaker canon, would have been applied to the
provision absent any constitutional concerns.214 In such a scenario, application of the
lowest common denominator principle in Martinez could be viewed as truly aggressive.
The St. Cyr decision presents a clearer situation where more than one canon was
applicable. In St. Cyr, the Court applied the avoidance canon and interpreted the relevant
provisions as not depriving courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction with regard to petitions
filed by criminal aliens.215 Subsequent to St. Cyr, some lower courts interpreted the same
provisions as not depriving courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction with regard to noncriminal aliens, even though such an interpretation would have been constitutional.216
Yet, in St. Cyr, unlike perhaps Zadvydas, another canon was relevant. The Court in St.
Cyr also cited the canon requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal

212

See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (describing these canons). The presumption against
retroactivity is another canon frequently used in immigration cases, although it is not often relevant in cases
where constitutional issues are raised. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that
retroactive statutes are not unconstitutional).
213
See supra note 89.
214
See supra note 31 (comparing the degree of ambiguity required to trigger the avoidance canon and the
immigration rule of lenity).
215
See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
216
See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
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habeas jurisdiction.217 Thus, after St. Cyr, lower courts correctly recognized that even
though the avoidance canon was not applicable, another canon was applicable and,
independent of the lowest common denominator principle, required that the provision be
interpreted in favor of non-criminal aliens.218
Another reason why the significance of the lowest common denominator should
not be overstated is that even when canons are used in an aggressive and unpredictable
manner, judicial decisions applying canons are not as dangerous to congressional
supremacy, at least in some respects, as judicial decisions that rest on constitutional
grounds.219 When a court ignores congressional intent and aggressively interprets a
statute in favor of an alien by applying the avoidance canon, and thus does not act as a
“faithful agent” of Congress, it can still be said to act with restraint by not deciding the
case on constitutional grounds. Congress can overturn a court decision by amending a
statute, but it cannot overturn a constitutional decision without amending the
Constitution.220 Many immigration commentators believe this judicial restraint comes at
a price, however.221 Because statutory decisions, as compared to constitutional decisions,

217

In addition, the Court cited the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.”
533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
218
See Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210, 214 (2001) (noting that although there was no Suspension
Clause problem because non-criminal aliens had another avenue of judicial review, the Court’s decision in
St. Cyr also rested on the basis that there must be a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas
jurisdiction). Because of the applicability of a second canon, Justice Thomas was incorrect in his dissent in
Martinez when he criticized lower courts for holding that habeas corpus jurisdiction still existed for noncriminal aliens subsequent to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr. 543 U.S. at 401 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219
See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 341 (2000) (noting that canons do
not create serious risks to the operation of the regulatory state because they only ensure congressional
deliberation on issues of great sensitivity).
220
When the Court applies the avoidance canon, however, Congress can interpret the decision as one that
creates constitutional rights and may be wary of attempting to overturn it. Lower courts may also interpret
the decision as making a constitutional holding, even when doing so is not warranted. See Motomura,
supra note 4, at 611.
221
See, e.g., Jose Javier Rodriguea, Recent Development, Clark v. Martinez: Limited Statutory
Construction Required by Constitutional Avoidance Offers Fragile Protection for Inadmissible Immigrants
From Indefinite Detention, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505, 518-19 (2005).
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can be much more readily fixed by Congress, they do not result in permanent rights for
aliens.222
The recent legislation targeting judicial review and the resulting litigation
illustrates both the limited nature of statutory decisions as protective devices for aliens
and how statutory decisions can operate as a dialectic between the courts and
Congress.223 In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA and AEDPA, which purported to make
significant changes to the judicial review provisions of the INA, almost all of which were
hostile to aliens.224 Courts generally interpreted these provisions very narrowly,
including the Court in St. Cyr when it saved habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal
aliens.225 In response to these decisions, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005,
generally eliminating from courts habeas corpus jurisdiction to review final orders of
removal.226 Significantly, however, Congress removed many of the bars to judicial
review in the federal courts of appeals that caused criminal aliens to file habeas corpus

222

On the other hand, even if the plenary power doctrine were ended, as many immigration scholars desire,
it is not clear how many more constitutional challenges to immigration statutes would be successful. For
example, it seems unlikely that the Court would ever view Congress’s power to regulate immigration as
suspect and effectively mandate open borders or hold that aliens have a fundamental right to remain in the
United States once they have entered, even if they have family members in the country. See Kif AugustineAdams, The Plenary Power Doctrine After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 706 (2005). Another
critically important doctrine of immigration law that would be unaffected by an end to the plenary power
doctrine is the longstanding principle that deportation is not punishment, which denies important
protections that criminal defendants receive, such as a right to government appointed counsel and a jury
trial and prohibitions on ex post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment. See Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1889 (2000). Thus, while constitutional decisions may result in permanent rights for
aliens, the scope of the rights gained from such decisions will probably always be relatively limited.
223
Earlier in this Article I used the REAL ID Act of 2005 to illustrate the way in which canons can add
predictability to the law by acting as background rules that guide Congress when it chooses statutory
language. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
224
See Neuman, supra note 101.
225
See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
226
See Ishak v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing how the “Real ID Act amended
section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, to place review of all final removal orders, for both criminal and
non-criminal aliens, in the courts of appeals”).
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petitions in district courts in order to challenge their removal orders.227 The end result is
that judicial review has largely been saved for criminal aliens, which was an open
question after IIRIRA was passed in 1996.228 Thus, while the statutory decisions by
courts did not result in permanent rights for aliens, the decisions led to a dialogue
between the courts and Congress that ultimately resulted in both preserved rights for
aliens and more precise legislation.229
Although the effects of the lowest common denominator principle should not be
overstated, it is important that the avoidance canon be applied carefully in immigration
cases. Justice Thomas complains that under the “lowest common denominator principle,
a statute like § 1231(a)(6) must be narrowed once and for all based on constitutional
concerns that may never materialize.”230 It should not seem surprising to Justice Thomas
that constitutional issues that are avoided may end up being decided in favor of the
government. Aggressive (but plausible) statutory interpretations are part of the legitimate
application of the avoidance canon, and the nature of the canon is such that the
constitutional issues are avoided, not decided.231 Nevertheless, because of the lowest
common denominator principle, an implausible statutory interpretation, as opposed to a
plausible, second-best interpretation, seems even more aggressive if the constitutional
issue is not one that would have been decided in favor of the alien.
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See Motomura, supra note 105, at 487.
See id. at 463.
229
See Elhauge, supra note 106, at 2210; Sunstein, supra note 219, at 331 (arguing that the presumption
against retroactivity, along with other canons such as the avoidance canon, act as nondelegation canons that
require sensitive issues (both constitutional and non-constitutional) to be deliberately and expressly
addressed by Congress).
230
Cf. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 397 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of course, a statute cannot be “narrowed once
and for all” by a court because Congress can always override the statutory decision. See supra notes 10306 and accompanying text (describing the REAL ID Act).
231
See supra Part II.A. (explaining that a legitimate aspect of the avoidance canon is the adoption of
second-best statutory interpretations).
228
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Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that when a court
chooses to avoid a constitutional question, it frequently also avoids the obligation of
careful consideration and reason giving that typically accompanies constitutional
adjudication.232 This criticism is particularly relevant to immigration law. Considering
their past history of using phantom constitutional norms when applying the avoidance
canon, courts must be particularly careful in immigration cases to ensure that the
constitutional issues to be avoided are indeed both real and serious.233 Especially in light
of the lowest common denominator principle, decisions that are too aggressive risk
unnecessarily disrupting Congress’s legislative designs rather than respecting Congress,
which is one of the purposes of the avoidance canon.234

V.

The Legitimacy of the Canons of Statutory Construction Chosen
by the Supreme Court
Thus far, this Article has accepted the Court’s choices about which canons to

create and apply and has dealt with various issues regarding over- or under utilization of
the canons it has chosen. It is widely accepted that the application of some type of
canons is inevitable because statutes frequently lack clarity, often because Congress is
either unable or unwilling to legislate with clarity.235 Choosing which canons to create
and apply is a more difficult issue, however. In cases of statutory ambiguity, for
example, courts have sometimes applied the immigration rule of lenity, which directs
232

See Young, supra note 76, at 1574. The Court itself acknowledged in Martinez that it does not engage
in a full constitutional analysis when it applies the avoidance canon. See 543 U.S at 381.
233
Another common complaint about the avoidance canon is that it creates a "penumbra" effect which
“actually broadens the impact of constitutional provisions beyond their legitimate warrant.” See Young,
supra note 76, at 1551. Similar to the phantom norms danger, if courts are careful when describing the
constitutional issues that they are avoiding, and careful to avoid only serious constitutional issues, the
penumbra effect should be limited, even though the statutory interpretation may be a second-best
interpretation.
234
See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s view that application of the
avoidance canon helps enact congressional intent).
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courts to interpret ambiguities in immigration statutes in favor of aliens.236 But why
should courts resolve statutory ambiguity in this manner? Why should a court not instead
apply an immigration rule of severity and interpret any ambiguities against aliens?
Although as “faithful agents” of Congress, courts often justify their statutory
interpretations on the basis of congressional intent, many of the canons currently applied
in immigration cases are hard to defend on the basis that their application helps enact
congressional intent. In fact, as this Part illustrates, it could be argued that some of the
canons run counter to congressional intent. Nevertheless, this reality does not make the
canons chosen by courts illegitimate. It cannot be doubted that all of the substantive
canons to some degree reflect value choices made by judges.237 The goal of statutory
interpretation may be primarily aimed at enforcing the intent of Congress, but an
exclusive focus on congressional intent tends to obscure the fact that judicial discretion is
inherent in statutory interpretation. Many judges, while still striving to uphold
congressional intent, desire to also promote other values.238 The values chosen by the
Court to protect in immigration cases are worthy ones, especially compared to the values
that would be promoted by alternative canons. This Part thus defends the immigration
canons that have been chosen by courts despite the fact that they do not always help enact
congressional intent.
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See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (describing the immigration rule of lenity).
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See Solan, supra note 32, at 477 (arguing that the avoidance canon does not “substitute for intent” but
rather “interact[s] with intent”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1992) ("[S]ubstantive
canons are not policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.").
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See generally Steven J. Cleveland, Judicial Discretion and Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV.
31 (2004); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389,
1404 (2005) (stating that “[w]hatever one’s school of thought, judicial judgment will always creep into the
equation in some form”).
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A.

The Relevance of Congressional Intent

When a statute is unclear, courts must decide whether the uncertainty is an
invitation to courts to make policy choices, through the application of canons or
otherwise, or, conversely, whether courts must attempt to adopt canons that will help
enact probable congressional intent.239 The choice between policy and congressional
intent may be a distinction without much of a difference, though. As faithful agents,
courts often justify the use of a canon on the basis that the application of it accurately
helps to enact congressional intent.240 Resolving the issue of which canons can be said to
reflect congressional intent is not easy, or perhaps even possible, however.241

1.

The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and
Congressional Intent

Consider the avoidance canon.242 In Martinez, Justice Scalia asserted that the
canon is “a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”243 The
theory, resting on what Justice Scalia terms a “reasonable presumption,” is that Congress
intends to legislate constitutionally and that Congress would thus prefer the statutory
interpretation that does not raise constitutional doubts.244 Accordingly, because Congress
239

See Nelson, supra note 31, at 394 (stating that “[u]nless interpreters are willing to hold statutes void for
vagueness, they need some way to finish the job and to pick from among the possible meanings that their
primary interpretive tools have identified”). The choice for courts posed in the text assumes that the
statutory ambiguity is not a delegation to agencies to make the policy choices, as envisioned in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Slocum, supra
note 30 (describing how the immigration rule of lenity interacts with the Chevron doctrine).
240
See Solan, supra note 32, at 430 (“courts frequently justify many of the canons of construction upon
which textualists rely as good proxies for the intent of the legislature”). But see Nelson, supra note 31, at
386 (“Textualists hesitate to argue that the best test of a canon is whether its use will minimize the gap
between what interpreters understand statutes to mean and what members of the enacting legislature
intended them to mean.”).
241
See Bradley, supra note 8, at 518 (stating that any attempt to ground canons in legislative intent
encounters substantial conceptual and empirical difficulties).
242
See supra Part I.B. (describing the avoidance canon).
243
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005).
244
See id. at 381; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“Congress . . . legislates in light of
constitutional limitations”); Note, Should the Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts Constitutionally?
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would not intend to overstep its constitutional boundaries, when a statute can reasonably
be interpreted in two distinct ways, one of which raises a potential constitutional issue,
the less problematic reading should prevail.
Not everyone agrees that application of the avoidance canon enacts congressional
intent, however. Some have argued that the canon is hard to defend in terms of capturing
Congress’s likely intent because “there is no particular reason to presume that members
of Congress systematically try to avoid gray areas and to refrain from pushing their
power to its limits.”245 The detention provision at issue in Zadvydas is a good example of
a statute where it can be said that Congress did not intend to avoid a gray area and wanted
to push its power to its constitutional limits.246 Professor Aleinikoff points out that
Congress had no reason to know before Zadvydas that its detention authority was
restrained by the Constitution.247 In addition, the detention provision at issue was
enacted as part of a statute, IIRIRA, that was the “toughest immigration legislation
adopted in half a century.”248 If an interpretation of the statute giving the government
power to detain even deportable (as opposed to only inadmissible) aliens indefinitely was
the interpretation most likely consistent with congressional intent, it could be concluded
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that the application of the canon was unwarranted.249 The application of the Zadvydas
interpretation in Martinez to cases involving inadmissible aliens, who likely can
constitutionally be indefinitely detained, could be said to only compound the mistake.250

2.

The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Congressional
Intent

Similar to the avoidance canon, it is questionable whether the immigration rule of
lenity helps to enact congressional intent.251 A possible theory that the canon helps enact
likely congressional intent is that deportation is a severe measure and fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations (values that Congress would presumably
endorse when the consequences of deportation are so great), dictate that ambiguities in
immigration statutes be interpreted against the government, not the alien.252 Throughout
much of the history of immigration law, however, it would be hard to argue that Congress
intended that ambiguities in immigration statutes be construed in favor of aliens. The
federal government’s early restrictions on immigration were motivated by racial animus,
and it was not until halfway through the twentieth century that racial restrictions were
eliminated from the INA.253 Recent immigration legislation, while perhaps not driven by
racial animus to the same extent, has been remarkably harsh.254 It could certainly be
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argued that it is doubtful that the same Congress that enacts immigration laws that
severely disadvantage aliens would intend that any ambiguities in these statutes be
interpreted in favor of aliens.
The reasoning that courts use when applying the immigration rule of lenity also
indicates that these courts have not necessarily invoked the canon in order to enact
congressional intent. Indeed, concern for the political vulnerability of aliens probably
motivated the Court in creating and applying the immigration rule of lenity more than a
desire to enact probable congressional intent.255 When the Court created the canon, it
stated that it was interpreting the relevant statute narrowly “because deportation is a
drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile,” not because doing so
would enact congressional intent. 256 The Court’s concern for the vulnerability of aliens
is evident in other areas of the law. While the Court has consistently upheld immigration
statutes from constitutional attack, on many occasions the Supreme Court has called
aliens a “discrete and insular minority” in striking down restrictions on aliens outside of
immigration law.257
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3.

The Presumption Against Retroactivity and
Congressional Intent

Other canons are similarly difficult to defend on the basis that Congress would
want them to be applied to immigration statutes. The presumption against retroactivity
may be premised on the idea members of Congress rarely intend to establish new
substantive rules for past conduct.258 The Court has stated that "[b]ecause it accords with
widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against
retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations.”259
Whether the application of the presumption against retroactivity does in fact enact
congressional intent in immigration cases is questionable. First, it certainly cannot be
said that Congress is at all reluctant to enact immigration laws with retroactive effect.260
Second, like the immigration rule of lenity, the Court’s statements suggest that its goal in
applying the presumption against retroactivity is fairness rather than an attempt to enact
congressional intent. In St. Cyr,261 for example, the Court noted that concerns about
retroactive laws become more acute when they target an “unpopular group” and stated
that “because noncitizens cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to adverse
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legislation.”262 In fact, the Court noted and rejected the government’s skepticism that
aliens are an unpopular group.263

B.

Canons as Background Rules Guiding Congress

As the above discussion illustrates, it is difficult to establish that any given canon
enacts Congress’s subjective intent, to the extent that such a subjective intent even
exists.264 Still, it is possible to argue that the canons applied in immigration cases still, in
a way, enact congressional intent. Several scholars, as well as Justice Scalia, have argued
that certain canons capture congressional intent because Congress presumably has them
in mind when it drafts a statute.265 This concept is evidenced by the REAL ID Act where
in response to the Court’s decision in St. Cyr, which applied canons of construction in
holding that Congress did not clearly repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction for criminal
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aliens, Congress passed the REAL ID Act which explicitly referenced 28 U.S.C. § 2241
“or any other habeas corpus provision.”266
Even if it cannot be assumed that Congress would want a canon, the immigration
rule of lenity for example, to be applied to any given immigration statute, the
immigration rule of lenity is an established canon that has been around for decades.267
Congress, at least to some degree, is capable of precluding the use of canons.268 Thus, it
can be argued that if the canon is well-established at the time a statute is enacted, its
application by courts to the statute is legitimate without regard to whether the canon is an
accurate measure of how members of Congress themselves understood the statute.269

C.

The Value of Canons in Promoting Important Public Values
in Immigration Law

While attempts have been made, such as the background rules theory described
above, to defend canons on the basis that they enact congressional intent, it cannot be
doubted that all of the substantive canons applied in immigration cases are, at least to
some degree, underpinned by values.270 Indeed, the discussion in Section A does not
establish that the canons used in immigration cases help enact congressional intent, but it
does illustrate that courts desire to promote other values. A presumption in favor of
retroactivity, for example, might be a more accurate measure of congressional intent in
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immigration cases than a presumption against retroactivity.271 Such a presumption,
though, would run counter to the Court’s desire, exhibited in St. Cyr, to protect a
vulnerable minority group from unfair legislation when doing so would not explicitly run
counter to congressional intent.272 Similar reasons undoubtedly motivate the Court’s
choice of other canons, such as the decision to apply the immigration rule of lenity
instead of an immigration rule of severity.273
The Court’s decision to select canons such as the presumption against
retroactivity and the immigration rule of lenity instead of a presumption in favor of
retroactivity and an immigration rule of severity can thus be defended on the theory that
courts should promote important public values through the creation and application of
canons. One of these values, according to Professor Sunstein, is that “[i]n the face of
ambiguity, courts should resolve interpretive doubts in favor of disadvantaged groups.”274
Undoubtedly, while this theory finds support in at least some of the Court’s decisions,
selecting canons on the basis of whether they favor disadvantaged groups would not
appeal to all of the Justices, and the Court’s selection of canons does not have to rest on
this basis. For example, Justice Scalia’s support for the idea that well-established canons
are legitimate because Congress has them in mind when it drafts a statute is closely
271
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connected to the theory that the judiciary should promote values associated with stability
in the law, which is usually achieved by interpreting statutes narrowly. Professor
Shapiro, for example, has argued that the application by courts of canons such as the
presumption against retroactivity and the criminal rule of lenity helps to promote values
such as predictability and continuity in statutory interpretation.275
Even dynamic statutory interpretation theories that seek to interpret statutes in
light of their present societal, political, and legal context can be used in support of the
canons that the Court has chosen to apply in immigration cases.276 Professor Elhauge, for
example, has suggested that ambiguous statutes be resolved by default rules that favor
political satisfaction at the time the judicial decision is made, but if the court is unable to
determine legislative preferences, it should adopt a construction aimed at spurring the
legislature to take up and resolve the otherwise indeterminate statutory question.277 In
Professor Elhauge’s view, the avoidance canon, the immigration rule of lenity, and the
presumption against retroactivity can all be defended on this basis.278
Regardless of the theory used to defend the canons chosen by the Court, the
careful application of canons by courts in immigration cases is part of the legitimate,
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appropriate and historical use of canons by courts generally.279 All of the canons
discussed in this Article serve important functions in helping judges resolve statutory
uncertainty in a way that promotes sound public policy and protects vulnerable aliens.
The benefits of abandoning the guidance of well-established canons such as the
immigration rule of lenity or the presumption against retroactivity on the ground that they
are not useful in interpreting statutes are dubious, while the benefits of retaining such
canons are numerous.280 Moreover, changing canons would undermine, at least
termporarily, the value and stability of canons as background rules guiding Congress and
would create difficult issues such as whether the new canons should be applied
retroactively to statutes passed before their creation.281
The canons currently applied in immigration cases are not, of course, universally
celebrated by scholars and courts. Some canons, particularly the avoidance canon, have
been subjected to harsh criticism and calls for their abolishment.282 Nevertheless, the
beauty of these canons is a matter of taste. Whether one sees the canons currently
applied as legitimate devices for courts to use when interpreting statutes, or illegitimate
usurpations of policy-making authority by courts, is a function of one’s jurisprudential
philosophy. One crucial point that cannot be debated, though, is that the Court approves
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of the use of the canons described in this Article and shows no signs of abandoning their
use any time soon.

CONCLUSION
Substantive canons of statutory interpretation occupy an important place in the
law. In immigration cases, they are especially significant because they usually direct
courts to interpret statutes in favor of aliens and have the potential, through the
application of the avoidance canon, of giving aliens as a whole greater rights, even if
sometimes only temporarily, than would a decision on constitutional grounds. Despite
their importance, the role of canons in immigration law has largely been either ignored or
impugned by the academy. Unfortunately, the role of canons will never receive the
attention lavished on the plenary power doctrine because statutory decisions do not result
in permanent rights for aliens. In addition, canons will always be the subject of criticism
because they do not always help enact congressional intent and are both over- and
underutilized by courts. Yet, considering the relative lack of constitutional rights
afforded aliens, canons are especially important devices in protecting this vulnerable part
of the population. When used properly, the application of canons in immigration cases
adds predictability to the law and helps to promote important public values, a
phenomenon sorely lacking elsewhere in immigration law.
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